Recently, the concept on 'forgeable quantum messages' in arbitrated quantum signature schemes was introduced by T. Kim et al. [Phys. Scr., 90, 025101 (2015)], and it has been shown that there always exists such a forgeable quantum message for every known arbitrated quantum signature scheme with four quantum encryption operators and the specific two rotation operators. We first extend the result to the case of any two unitary rotation operators, and then consider the forgeable quantum messages in the schemes with four quantum encryption operators and three or more rotation operators. We here present a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a forgeable quantum message, and moreover, by employing the condition, show that there exists an arbitrated quantum signature scheme which contains no forgeable quantum message-signature pairs.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been known that quantum cryptography provides us with unconditional security in key distribution. In order to extend the range of quantum cryptographic primitives, other quantum-mechanics-based cryptographic schemes such as signature schemes should be studied and developed.
Even though quantum mechanics can help in digitally signing classical messages [1] , and its techniques have been developed [2, 3] , it unfortunately turns out that it is not possible to digitally sign quantum messages [4] . On the other hand, it has been shown that it could be possible to quantumly sign quantum messages with the assistance of an arbitrator, which is called the arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] .
However, it has been also shown that the AQS schemes can be vulnerable to receiver's forgery attacks [9, 10, 12, [14] [15] [16] . In particular, according to the result in Ref. [16] , for almost all known AQS schemes, there are forgeable quantum message-signature pairs which can be forged by the receiver, although all other pairs cannot be forged. Furthermore, there
has not yet been an analytical proof that there exists an AQS scheme without any forgeable quantum message-signature pairs.
In this paper, we first show that there is always a forgeable quantum message-signature pair in an AQS scheme with two quantum random rotations, and present a necessary and sufficient condition for a given AQS scheme with four quantum encryption operators and three or more quantum random rotations to produce at least one forgeable quantum message.
By using this condition, we analytically prove that there exists an AQS scheme without any forgeable quantum message-signature pairs.
II. FORGEABLE QUANTUM MESSAGES
Most qubit-based AQS schemes have two quantum signature operators, the random rotation {R j } j∈Z 2 defined by two Pauli operators σ x and σ z , that is, R 0 = σ x and R 1 = σ z , and the quantum encryption {E k } k∈Z 4 [17] with unitary operator E k satisfying 1 4
for any qubit state ρ. It follows that 1 8
Thus, for a given quantum message |M and a previously shared key (j, k), its signature |S
Let (|M ′ , |S ′ ) be the transmitted message-signature pair. Then we say that the signature is valid if
where |A ≃ |B if and only if |A equals |B up to global phase. In other words,
for some real number θ jk . We note that one can determine with high probability whether the signature is valid or not, by using the swap test [18] for proper number of copies of the states.
In addition, we remark that quantum encryptions in all existing AQS schemes can be essentially reduced to the quantum encryption with four unitary operators
for some uniatry operator W , which is called an assistant unitary operator of the AQS scheme [15] , where σ 0 = I, σ 1 = σ x , σ 2 = σ y and σ 3 = σ z .
Recently, Kim et al. [16] proposed a new concept, forgeable quantum messages as follows.
For a given AQS scheme with the unitary random rotation {R j } and quantum encryption of the form in Eq. (6), there exist a quantum message |M 0 , a non-identity unitary Q and a unitary U such that
for all j ∈ Z 2 and k ∈ Z 4 if and only if the quantum message |M 0 is said to be forgeable in the AQS scheme. This implies that the receiver can forge at least one quantum message and its signature by exploiting a pair of forgery operators Q and U, although all other quantum message-signature pairs cannot be forged.
III. MAIN RESULTS

Theorem 1.
Assume that an AQS scheme consists of the random rotation {R j } j∈Z 2 defined by two unitary operators and a quantum encryption {σ k W } k∈Z 4 with an assistant unitary operator W . Then there exists at least one forgeable qubit message |M 0 in the AQS scheme.
Proof. We here take Q = σ 1 . Then for any unitary W , we note that
Thus it suffices to show that
for some qubit state |M .
Since the unitary operator
has an eigenstate with a complex eigenvalue of modulus one by the spectral decomposition theorem, there exists a message |M 0 such that
that is,
For example, we assume that an AQS scheme consists of the random rotation {R j } j∈Z 2 defined by two Pauli operators σ x and σ z and a quantum encryption {σ k W } k∈Z 4 with an assistant unitary operator W . Then there exists at least one forgeable qubit message |M 0 by Theorem 1. It means that there exists at least one forgeable qubit message in most of the previously known AQS schemes.
We now introduce the following basic property in linear algebra [19] to obtain our main results.
Proposition 2. Two r × r matrices A and B have a common eigenvector if and only if
where, for an r × r matrix C, ker(C) = {x ∈ C r |Cx = 0} is called the kernel of C.
We remark that ker(C) = {0} if and only if C is invertible, and hence two 2 × 2 matrices A and B have a common eigenvector if and only if ker(AB − BA) = {0}, that is, det (AB − BA) = 0. Since we here deal with only 2 × 2 matrices, we obtain the following lemma by employing the above remark and Proposition 2.
Lemma 3. Assume that an AQS scheme consists of the random rotation {R j } j∈{1,2,3} with R j ∈ {σ l : l ∈ Z 4 } and a quantum encryption {σ k W } k∈Z 4 with an assistant unitary operator W , and that there exists a forgeable quantum message, that is, there exist a quantum message |M 0 , forgery operators Q and U such that
where
for q l ∈ R, q 0 ≥ 0 with l∈Z 4 q 2 l = 1. Then q l = q l ′ = 0 for some distinct l and l ′ in Z 4 .
have a common eigenvector |M 0 . Thus, by Proposition 2,
Hence we obtain that there exist at least two l, l ′ in Z 4 such that q l = q l ′ = 0.
We note that any 2 × 2 unitary operator can be expressed as the form of Eq. (15) up to global phase. Thus we may assume that an assistant unitary operator W is
where w l ∈ R, w 0 ≥ 0 and l∈Z 4 w 2 l = 1. Then for distinct l, m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let
and let W lmn be the set of assistant unitary operators satisfying the equality α l β m γ n = 0, that is,
Theorem 4. Assume that an AQS scheme consists of the random rotation {R j } j∈{1,2,3} with for some distinct l, m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 3, without loss of generality, we may assume thatR j = σ j for every j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Suppose that W ∈ W lmn for some distinct l, m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We may also assume that W ∈ W 123 , without loss of generality, that is, α 1 β 2 γ 3 = 0. Note that for any unitary W ,
for all k ∈ Z 4 . Therefore, it follows from Eqs. (25) that for each j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and k ∈ Z 4 , the matrix
is one of at most two matrices up to global phase, since α 1 β 2 γ 3 = 0. For example, if
Hence we can easily show that there exists a forgeable quantum message, as in the proof of Theorem 1.
We now suppose that there exists a forgeable quantum message. For a given assistant unitary operator W , there exist a quantum message |M 0 , a non-identity unitary Q = q 0 σ 0 + iq 1 σ 1 − iq 2 σ 2 + iq 3 σ 3 and a unitary U such that
for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and k ∈ Z 4 . Then it follows from Lemma 3 that q l = q l ′ = 0 for some
If Q = q 0 σ 0 + i(−1) t−1 q t σ t then we can obtain from tedious but straightforward calcula-
as in the proof of Lemma 3, the two 2 × 2 matrices
have a common eigenvector, that is, the two matrices
have a common eigenvector. It follows from Proposition 2 and tedious calculations that [15, 16] , then α 1 = 0 or α 3 = 0, respectively, and hence H ∈ W 123 and W a ∈ W 312 . Therefore we can clearly obtain from Theorem 4 that an AQS scheme which uses H or W a as an assistant unitary operator has at least one forgeable quantum message.
In Ref. [16] , the AQS scheme with three or more random rotation operators and an assistant unitary operator
was considered as a good candidate for the AQS scheme without forgeable quantum messages, and it was numerically shown that the AQS scheme does not generate any forgeable quantum message, but any analytical proof has not yet been obtained. However, it is readily shown that T / ∈ W lmn for any distinct l, m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and furthermore
∈ W lmn for any distinct t, s ∈ {1, 2, 3} and any distinct l, m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. It follows that we can use Theorem 4 to simply prove the following corollary.
Corollary 5. There exists an AQS scheme without any forgeable quantum message.
We remark that the set
is an infinite set, and hence there exist infinitely many AQS schemes with no forgeable quantum message.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have dealt with a recently proposed concept, forgeable quantum messages, in the AQS schemes, and have proved that there exists a forgeable quantum message in every AQS scheme with two quantum random rotations. Furthermore, we have presented a necessary and sufficient condition for an AQS scheme with four quantum encryption operators and three or more quantum random rotations in which there exists a forgeable quantum message. In other words, we have perfectly characterized assistant unitary operators in the quantum encryption operators which produce at least one forgeable quantum message. In the sequel, we have analytically shown that there exists an AQS scheme without any forgeable quantum messages, by exploiting the necessary and sufficient condition.
In addition to the forgery problem, the AQS schemes may have other security problems which we have not considered in this paper, but should consider in order to obtain a practically useful quantum signature scheme to sign quantum messages. Nonetheless, our work provides a perfect characterization of the AQS schemes yielding forgeable quantum messages, although we have taken into account the specific AQS schemes. Therefore, it could be helpful to conduct further research works related to the AQS, and could be also useful to improve quantum cryptographic theories.
